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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Stephen Rozajewski appeals contending that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress the evidence found in his room when it was searched 
pursuant to a warrant. The district court denied Mr. Rozajewski's motion even though it 
found that the officer applying for the warrant made two false representations to the 
magistrate in reckless disregard of the truth. 
Mr. Rozajewski asserts that the district court erred by not setting aside the false 
representations in their entirety, as it was supposed to, and also by considering 
evidence that the officer could have, but did not, present to the magistrate in evaluating 
whether probable cause remained after the false representations were set aside. He 
also asserts that the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding about what 
evidence was known to the magistrate. Mr. Rozajewski contends that, with the officer's 
false representations properly set aside and considering only the evidence that was 
actually presented to the magistrate, there was not sufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause to support the warrant. 
Additionally, Mr. Rozajewski contends that the protective sweep of his room, 
conducted before the officer sought the warrant, but an hour after the associated arrest 
was effected, was improper. 
For both of these reasons, all the evidence found in his room should have been 
suppressed. Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Rozajewski's 
motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Rozajewski was attending classes at Treasure Valley Community College 
and had just found a new place to live. (Tr., p.79, Ls.9-11 (defense counsel noting that 
Mr. Rozajewski had been doing well in his classes); Tr., p.11, Ls.15-24 (Officer Larry 
Hemmert acknowledging that Mr. Rozajewski had moved into his new place two days 
before Officer Hemmert's visit to the house).) However, his new landlord, Shon Delisle, 
was having problems, which resulted in a visit from his probation officers to arrest him 
for violating his probation. ( See 1 /28/14 Hemmert Report attached to Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.168.)1 Although Mr. Rozajewski was not on 
probation himself, (see, e.g., Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.25, Ls.13-18.) Mr. Delisle's 
probation violation would also impact Mr. Rozajewski because, in following up on that 
probation violation, one of the officers lied to get a warrant to search Mr. Rozajewski's 
room. (R., pp.80-81 (finding that two false representations were made with reckless 
disregard of the truth during the warrant application hearing).) 
The probation officers requested the assistance of patrol officers to arrest 
Mr. Delisle. As a result, Officer Hemmert and Officer D. Schreiber were sent to help the 
probation officers at 12:19 p.m. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.168.) 
Shortly after arriving on scene, Officer Hemmert placed Mr. Delisle under arrest, and 
Officer Schreiber took Mr. Delisle to the Canyon County Jail. (1/28/14 Hemmert 
Report attached to PSI, p.168.) There were three other people inside the house when 
Mr. Delisle was arrested: Mr. Delisle's girlfriend Karen Lechner (also appears in the 
1 The police reports attached to the PSI appear to have been copied from other 
documents which had been paginated in the lower right corner. Those page numbers 
are included in references to those reports. 
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record as "Leischner"), Mr. Rozajewski, and Mr. Rozajewski's friend Lisa Lee. ('1/28/14 
Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.168.) 
After Mr. Delisle had been taken away, the probation officers and Officer 
Hemmert searched the house. (1/28/'14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.168.) 
However, they did not search Mr. Rozajewski's room because he 1.vas not on probation 
and he refused to consent to a search of his room. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) Officer 
Hemmert found drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in the living room and the kitchen as 
well as the room Mr. Delisle shared with Ms. Lechner. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.4.) 
After completing that search, Officer Hemmert interviewed the three people still 
being detained at the house and, ultimately, issued summons to all of them. (1/28/14 
Hemmert Report attached to PSI, pp.168-69.) During his interview, Mr. Rozajewski said 
none of the items Officer Hemmert had found were his. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-16.) It was at 
that point that Officer Hemmert asked Mr. Rozajewski for his permission to search his 
room. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, p.169.) When Mr. Rozajewski did not 
give consent, Officer Hemmert called for additional assistance so that he could request 
a search warrant for Mr. Rozajewski's room. (1/28/14 Hemmert Report attached to PSI, 
p.169.) 
Officer Steve Fisher received Officer Hemmert's request for additional assistance 
at approximately 1:15 p.m. (1/28/14 Fisher Report attached to PSI, p.201.) When he 
got to the house, he found four other officers on scene. (1/28/14 Fisher Report attached 
to PSI, p.201.) Officer Fisher was briefed on the situation and informed that 
Mr. Rozajewski's room had not been searched. (Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.6.) There was 
no indication that the other officers were concerned for their safety at that time. ( See 
generally Tr., Reports attached to PSI.) Nevertheless, Officer Fisher decided to perform 
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a protective sweep of Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-14.) There is no 
indication in Officer Fisher's report as to what he saw or did not see while conducting 
that search.2 (See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing; 1/28/14 Fisher 
Report attached to PSI, pp.201-03.) 
After sweeping Mr. Rozajewski's room, Officer Fisher went to apply for a search 
warrant. (1/28/14 Fisher Report attached to PSI, p.202.) Officer Hemmert stayed at the 
house, where Ms. Lee subsequently told him that she had left a pipe with 
methamphetamine in it in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.2.) Officer 
Hemmert relayed that statement to Officer Fisher. (Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.13.) 
Officer Fisher subsequently gave testimony in support of his application for a 
warrant. (See Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.)3 He testified that, "Upon entering 
[the house], they [the other officers] found drug paraphernalia in plain view. Drug 
paraphernalia consisted of a marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a methamphetamine 
pipe." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00.) He continued, "And Shon 
Diesel [sic] ultimately ended up going to jail. During the course of that search, they 
came in contact with a Steven Rozowski [sic, phonetic]. I have trouble pronouncing his 
last name. He just recently moved into the 2021 Washington residence, has a room in 
2 As will be discussed infra, Officer Fisher gave more detailed information about his 
protective sweep at an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Rozajewski's subsequent motion to 
suppress. 
3 Mr. Rozajewski filed a motion for the district court to take judicial notice of the warrant 
application proceedings. (R., p.71.) Although the district court did not enter a formal 
order granting that motion (see generally R.), it did state that it had listened to the audio 
recording of the warrant application proceedings at the hearing on Mr. Rozajewski's 
motion to suppress. (Tr., p.5, Ls.11-13.) 
Since the testimony at that hearing is the focus of Mr. Rozajewski's motion to 
suppress, references to that testimony will include the specific time (minutes:seconds) 
in the recording the statements were made. Where quotations from that hearing are 
necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate counsel's ability. 
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the southwest corner." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:00-2:22.) When asked 
if he had seen the drug paraphernalia the other officers found, Officer Fisher replied that 
he had and that "[i]t was in the front living area as soon as you walked in the front door." 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:32-2:46.) 
He also told the magistrate that he had conducted a protective sweep of 
Mr. Rozajewski's room: "When I got there, I asked immediately if a protective sweep 
had been done to the residence. They told me the only room that they didn't do a 
sweep on was Steven's room and I opened the door and did a protective sweep and 
just made for sure nobody was in there." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
2:46-3:05.) He did not tell the magistrate what, if anything, he had seen during that 
protective sweep. ( See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) Officer Fisher 
admitted that the room had not been searched before he arrived because "Steven is not 
on probation and he would not consent to a search of his bedroom." (Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 3:10-3:19.) When asked to explain why he suspected there would 
be evidence of drug use in that room, Officer Fisher testified: 
A. Upon interviewing Lisa Lee, Shon Diesel's [sic] significant other, she 
says that there's meth inside the room with a methamphetamine pipe. 
Q. Did she say she'd seen that? 
A. Yes. 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:21-3:44.) 
Officer Fisher then proceeded to describe where the bedroom was located in the 
house. There was some confusion as to whether Mr. Rozajewski's room was in the 
southeast or southwest corner of the house. (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
3:47-4:15.) The warrant was ultimately amended by interlineation to indicate it was in 
the southwest corner. (See Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:47-6:18) Officer 
Fisher was also asked to describe how to get to Mr. Rozajewski's room from the front 
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door, and he responded: "You enter the residence, you go to the right into a little 
hallway and the bedroom door is right there on the right side." (Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 6:17-6:34.) 
Officer Fisher's testimony concluded when he was asked to reiterate the reasons 
he believed that there was evidence to be found in Mr. Rozajewski's room. He 
responded: "Due to all the drugs found inside the residence in the common area and 
also Lisa Lee's statements stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom." (Audio of 
Warrant Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) The magistrate followed up with a few 
questions about who lived in the house: 
Q. Does Lisa Lee live there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With Mr. Diesel [sic]? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rojowski [sic, phonetic] or --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- whatever his name is. 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 6:58-7:05.) 
Based on Officer Fisher's oral affidavit, the magistrate issued a warrant to search 
Mr. Rozajewski's room. (Audio of Warrant Application hearing 7:05-8:38.) Upon 
executing that search warrant, officers found methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, 
and a marijuana cigarette. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 13, L.23 - p.14, L.9, p.16, Ls.16-
19.) They also found a gun under the bed. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.16, Ls.19-22.) 
As a result, Mr. Rozajewski was charged with possession of a controlled substance and 
unlawful possession of a firearm, along with a persistent violator enhancement.4 
(R., pp.19-22.) 
4 There were two other misdemeanor cases arising from this same incident that were 
addressed at the same time this case was addressed. (See, e.g., Tr., p.45, Ls.4-6; PSI, 
pp.19-20.) 
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Mr. Rozajewski filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found in his room 
because he asserted that Officer Fisher had made four material false representations 
(three statements and one omission) to the magistrate in his application for the 
search warrant. (R., pp.65-67.) Specifically, those false representations were: (1) that 
Ms. Lee was Mr. Delisle's girlfriend; (2) that Ms. Lee lived at the residence; (3) that 
Ms. Lee had seen methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room (rather than that she 
had left her methamphetamine in that room); and (4) that Officer Fisher had not testified 
that he did not see anything concerning during his protective sweep of Mr. Rozajewski's 
room. (Tr., p.7, Ls.15-21; see R., p.67.) 
Defense counsel questioned Officer Fisher on these various false 
representations. Officer Fisher testified that he had simply misspoken when he said 
Ms. Lee was in a relationship with Mr. Delisle.5 (Tr., p.28, Ls.8-9.) He explained that, 
based on what he saw at the house, he believed that Ms. Lee was in a relationship with 
Mr. Rozajewski, not Mr. Delisle, and concluded that, because Mr. Rozajewski and 
Ms. Lee were in a relationship, they were living together. (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-16.) However, 
he did not question anyone to verify or dispel those assumptions. (See Tr., p.24, L.24 -
p.25, L.6.) Officer Fisher also testified that he did not recall Officer Hemmert telling him 
that Ms. Lee had said she left her methamphetamine in the room, although Officer 
Hemmert testified that he did remember relaying that statement to Officer Fisher. 
(Tr., p.25, L.18 - p.26, L.10 (Officer Fisher's testimony on this point); Tr., p.16, L.19 -
p.17, L.13 (Officer Hemmert's testimony on this point).) Finally, he testified that he had 
seen what he thought was a butane torch and a pipe when he conducted the protective 
5 This was the same explanation for getting both Mr. Delisle and Mr. Rozajewski's 
names wrong during the warrant application hearing. (Tr., p.24, Ls.10-16; Tr., p.28, 
Ls.10-15.) 
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sweep. (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-6.) He explained that he did not tell the magistrate about that 
because he thought it would "muddy up the warrant." (Tr., p.22, Ls.13-14.) 
The district court considered each of the false representations in turn. In regard 
to the first representation, the district court found that Officer Fisher did not act 
recklessly when he testified that Ms. Lee was in a relationship with Mr. Delisle; he had 
just misspoken. (R., p.80.) In regard to the fourth representation (the material 
omission), the district court found that the omission was not prejudicial because, had 
Officer Fisher disclosed what he had seen during the protective sweep, that information, 
by itself, would have supplied probable cause for the warrant. (R., p.81.) 
However, as to the second representation, the district court found that Officer 
Fisher had made a false representation with a reckless disregard of the truth. 
Specifically, it found that Officer Fisher's testimony that Ms. Lee lived at the house 
arose from Officer Fisher's unjustified assumption of that fact. (R., p.80.) The 
assumption was unjustified because it was based only on the fact that Ms. Lee and 
Mr. Rozajewski were sitting together when Officer Fisher arrived at the scene and he 
made no attempt to confirm or dispel that assumption. (R., p.80.) Furthermore, on the 
third representation, Officer Fisher's testimony - that Ms. Lee had seen the 
paraphernalia in the room - conveyed an erroneous impression that was different than 
the statement she actually gave to Officer Hemmert and which had been relayed to 
Officer Fisher. (R., p.81.) Therefore, the district court found that testimony was also a 
false representation made in reckless disregard of the truth. (R., p.81.) 
The district court recognized that the next step of the relevant analysis was to set 
aside the false representations and determine if probable cause still existed without 
them. (R., p.81.) However, the district court did not set aside the statement that 
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Ms. Lee lived at the house because it determined that it was not material, in that the 
finding of probable cause would not have been altered if it were set aside. (R., p.83.) 
Ultimately, the district court found that the remaining information "known to the 
magistrate was that officers found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a 
tin containing marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of 
the [sic] Delisle and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's 
room." (R., p.83.) Based on that conclusion, the district court determined, "after 
deleting the false statements and including exculpatory information about the location of 
the methamphetamine, the magist;ate could still have concluded that there was a fair 
probability that evidence of a crime could have been found in the defendant's room. 
(R., pp.82.) Therefore, it denied Mr. Rozajewski's motion to suppmss. (R., p.83.) 
Mr. Rozajewski subsequently entered a conditional plea reserving his right to 
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.97; Tr., p.48, L.23 - p.51, L.9.) He 
entered an Alford plea6 to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. (Tr., p.45, 
Ls.17-24.) The State agreed to dismiss all the remaining charges and enhancements 
related to this incident. (Tr., p.45, Ls.4-24; see also PSI, pp.19-20.) The district court 
imposed and executed a unified sentence of five years, with four years fixed, on 
Mr. Rozajewski. (R., p.101.) Mr. Rozajewski filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.115-18.) 
6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Rozajewski's motion to suppress. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rozajewski's Motion To Suppress 
A. After The False Re resentations In The Warrant A lication Are Pro erl Set 
Aside, The Remaining Evidence Is Not Sufficient To Give Rise To Probable 
Cause, And Therefore, The Search Pursuant To That Warrant Was Not Valid 
While the district court identified the proper rule governing Mr. Rozajewski's 
claim - that the warrant was impermissibly based on false information - it made several 
errors in applying that rule to this case: (1) it failed to properly set aside all the false 
representations; (2) it improperly considered facts that were not presented to the 
magistrate in its evaluation of whether there was still probable cause after the false 
statements were set aside; and (3) it relied on a clearly erroneous factual finding about 
the evidence that had been presented to the magistrate in its evaluation of whether 
there was still probable cause after the false statements were set aside. For all those 
reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the motion to 
suppress the evidence found during the search based on the warrant which was 
obtained by making false representations to the magistrate. 
To establish probable cause for a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, the 
State must present evidence showing a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93 (1993); 
State v. Harper, 152 Idaho 93, 98 (Ct. App. 2011 ). An inherent part of that rule is that 
the facts being relied on must be truthfully presented to the magistrate. Id.; see also 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-165 (1978); State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41 
(1979). "To have a warrant set aside on the ground that its issuance was based on a 
false representation of material fact, the defendant must establish that the false 
representation: (1) was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for 
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truth; and (2) that the facts included or omitted were material to the magistrate's finding 
of probable cause." State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 279 (Ct. App. 1993); see Franks, 
438 U.S. at 156. The inclusion of false representations in the affidavit or testimony of 
the officer is material if, without those representations, probable cause would not have 
been found. Id. An omission is material if there is a "substantial probability" that, had 
the omitted information been presented, it would have altered the finding of probable 
cause. Id. 
Whether the misrepresentation of fact is material (i.e., whether there wou!d still 
be probable cause if the false representations were set aside) is a question of law that 
this Court reviews de novo. State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47 (Ct. App. 1999). 
However, the determination of whether the erroneous statements were made 
intentionally or recklessly, as opposed to negligently or mistakenly, will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that such a determination is clearly erroneous. Id. 
1. The District Court Failed To Set Aside All Of Officer Fisher's False 
Representations From Its Consideration Of Whether There Was Probable 
Cause 
The district court found that two of Officer Fisher's representations were false 
and made with reckless disregard of the truth: (1) that Ms. Lee lived at the house; and 
(2) that Ms. Lee had seen methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (R., pp.80-81.) 
When the false representations in the warrant application process speak to the basis for 
the affiant's knowledge of the link between the suspect and the items being sought 
under the warrant, the affiant "'can manipulate the inference a magistrate will draw. To 
allow a magistrate to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause 
requirement of all real meaning."' State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 530 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 769 
12 
F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, when such a false representation is made, the 
entire representation must be removed from the evaluation of whether there was 
probable cause. Id. Since both of Officer Fisher's recklessly false representations 
speak to the link between Mr. Rozajewski and the items the officers thought would be in 
his room, they needed to be set aside in their entirety. However, the district court did 
not set aside the first false representation at all, and it did not fully set aside the second. 
Therefore, its evaluation of whether there was still probable cause absent those false 
representations was erroneous. 
a. The District Court Erred B { Not Setting Aside Officer Fisher's False 
Representation That Ms. Lee Lived At The House 
Despite finding that Officer Fisher had falsely testified that Ms. Lee lived in the 
house with reckless regard for the truth (R., p.80), the district court decided that false 
representation "need not be omitted" based on the district court's determination that the 
false representation was not material. (R., p.83.) That is a clear misapplication of the 
rule set forth in Franks. 
Franks established a two-step test for determining whether an officer's false 
statements in procuring a warrant should be the basis for suppressing the evidence 
found as a result of that warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. 156; see, e.g., United 
States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1445-46 (8th Cir. 1995). The first step is for the district 
court to determine whether an intentional or reckless false representation was made. 
Id. If so, then the district court is to set that false representation aside. Id. Only once 
that false representation is removed from consideration can the district court properly 
engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there was probable 
cause based only on the information properly presented to the magistrate. See Ozar, 
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50 F.3d at 1445-46. If the district court skips the first step and does not set the false 
representations aside, but instead, jumps straight to the second step, it "frustrates 
appellate review'' of the issue because the district court fails to engage in a meaningful 
or effective analysis of whether the error was harmless. Id. 
Basically, the distiict court that does not set the false representation aside fails to 
remove the error from the equation, and so, the answer it reaches is still tainted by 
erroneous information. See id. Such an answer is as unreliable as the magistrate's 
original conclusion. However, that is exactly what the district court did in this case, and 
thus, its conclusion about whether probable cause existed without the false 
representations is unreliable and should be disregarded. 
The whole point of the Franks analysis is to make sure that officers did not obtain 
warrants based on false information because if they have, they violate the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165; Lindner, 100 Idaho at 
41. As defense counsel pointed out, the false representation that Ms. Lee lived at the 
house was material because it enhanced the impact of her statement - she knows that 
Mr. Rozajewski had drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in his room because she lives 
there, thus, had the opportunity to see what was in Mr. Rozajewski's room. (See 
Tr., p.34, Ls.12-21.) This is precisely the type of manipulation of inferences the 
magistrate might draw that had the Court of Appeals concerned in Chapple. Chapple, 
124 Idaho at 530. As such, this false representation, which establishes to the link 
between Mr. Rozajewski and the items being sought, needed to be set aside before a 
proper evaluation of the evidence could occur. Id. As a result, the district court erred by 
not setting aside Officer Fisher's false representation that Ms. Lee lived at the house 
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before evaluating whether probable cause could be found on the information properly 
presented at the warrant application hearing. 
b. The District Court Erred By !'Jot Fully Setting Aside Officer Fisher's 
False Representation About Ms. Lee's Statements Regarding The 
Evidence Pur ortedl In The Bedroom 
Based on the testimony given at the warrant application hearing, the warrant in 
this case was only issued based on two factual representations: "Due to all the drugs 
found inside the residence in the common area and also Lisa Lee's statements 
stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom." (Audio of Warrant Application 
Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) The district court found, as a matter of fact, that one of those 
representations - that Ms. Lee had told officers that she had seen drugs in 
Mr. Rozajewski's room - was false and was made in reckless disregard of the truth. 
(R., p.80.) 
However, the district court did not set aside that false representation in its 
entirety; it still considered the fact that there was "methamphetamine in a backpack in 
[Mr. Rozajewski's] room." (R., p.83.) That decision was wrong for two reasons: 
(1) when the false representation in the warrant application goes to the officer's 
knowledge of how the suspect is connected to the criminal activity and/or the evidence 
being sought, the entire false representation needs to be set aside; and (2) it is not 
proper for the district court to consider information that the officer could have, but did 
not actually, present to the magistrate judge. 
For either of those reasons, the fact that Ms. Lee had said there was drugs 
and/or drug paraphernalia in a backpack Mr. Rozajewski's room was erroneously 
considered by the district court. 
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i. The Officer's False Representation About Ms. Lee's 
Statement Needed To Be Set Aside In Its Entirety 
!n his testimony to the magistrate judge, Officer Fisher made two statements 
about what Ms. Lee had told him about the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia purportedly 
in Mr. Rozajewski's room: (1) "Upon interviewing Lisa Lee, Shon Diesel's [sic] 
significant other, she says there is meth inside the room with a methamphetamine pipe," 
because "she'd seen that," (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 3:21-3:44); and, 
(2) "Due to ... Lisa Lee's statements stating that there was drugs inside the bedroom," 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54). The district court found, as a matter 
of fact, that was not a true representation. (R., p.81.) 
The reason those representations were false is that they assert, or at least imply, 
that it was Mr. Rozajewski who owned the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in his room 
even though Ms. Lee actually told Officer Hemmert the drugs were hers. (Tr., p.14, 
L.24 - p.15, L.2.) This is yet another example of the Court of Appeals' concern 
regarding untruthful applications for warrants: when the officer does not accurately 
recount the basis for his knowledge of the link between the suspect and the items to be 
seized, he '"can manipulate the inference a magistrate will draw. To allow a magistrate 
to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real 
meaning."' Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530 (quoting Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781). 
Similar to the representations Officer Fisher made in this case, the officer 
applying for the search warrant in Chapple attested that "Val Chapple is known to your 
affiant as an associate of Jill Olsen. In fact, your affiant has talked with Val Chapple 
about his associates and he confirmed his association with Jill Olsen." Id. at 530. As 
the Court of Appeals pointed out, this statement "suggests that Chapple confirmed 
directly to [the officer] that he was an associate of Olsen." Id. However, in response to 
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Mr. Chapple's motion to suppress, the officer provided more detail about his 
representation in the warrant applicaiion: he clarified that Mr. Chapple had recognized 
Ms. Olsen in a photograph the officer had shown him and had "identif[ied] Jill Olsen by 
name and indicated he knew her face and/or had seen her around." Id. Based on that 
clarification, the Court of Appeals found that the officer lied in his warrant application: 
"Far from verifying that Olsen was his associate in criminal conduct, Chapple's 
statements to Officer Morgan indicates that Olsen was, at most, a passing 
acquaintance." Id. 
That false representation - that Mr. Chapple was associated with Ms. Olsen -
established the connection between Mr. Chapple and Ms. Olsen's drug trafficking 
operation. Therefore, the whole representation was tainted and had to be set aside. As 
a result, the Court of Appeals "remove[d the officer's] statement about Chapple's 
connection to Olsen from the evidence submitted to obtain the search warrant."7 
7 In other cases, where the officer's misstatement only spoke to a specific fact about, for 
example, the place to be searched or the items being sought, the Court of Appeals has 
set aside only the specific portion of the statement which was erroneous. Thus, when 
an officer testified that the truck he sought to search was "maroon," even though the 
victim had told him it was "brown," the Court of Appeals removed the term "maroon" 
from the affidavit, but considered the remainder of the officer's testimony about the truck 
in its probable cause determination. State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 512-13 (Ct. App. 
1996). Similarly, when the officer included various items being sought in his affidavit 
even though those items had already been recovered, the warrant was still appropriate. 
State v. Thompson, 121 Idaho 638, 641 (Ct. App. 1992). The Thompson Court implied 
that, even if the improperly-listed items were removed from the application, there would 
still be probable cause for the warrant to issue because there were other items listed in 
the warrant were still missing. Id. 
However, unlike in Chapple, the misstatements in Kay and Thompson did not 
mislead the magistrate as to how the officer was aware of the fact or mislead the 
magistrate in such a way as would manipulate the inferences the magistrate would draw 
about the connection between the suspect and the place to be searched and/or the 
items sought. Therefore, the more narrow strikes were appropriate in those cases. 
However, in Chapple, the Court of Appeals did not just strike the representation that 
Mr. Chapple was an associate of Ms. Olsen's and still consider the fact that he did 
know her because the taint of the false representation would still be impacting the 
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id. (emphasis added). Without those statements, "the evidence of probable cause [fails] 
like a house of cards ... there is nothing to tie Chapple to Olsen's drug-related 
activities." Id. 
In this case, as in Chapple, Officer Fisher's false representations established the 
connection between Mr. Rozajewski and the items sought in his room, manipulating the 
inferences the magistrate would draw about those items - notably, whose they were, 
and thus, who knew that they were in the room. In fact, this was the district court's 
expressed concern with the officer's lie. (R., pp.81-82.) As a result, all Officer Fisher's 
erroneous representations regarding Ms. Lee's statements should have been set aside. 
Thus, the district court's reliance on part of Officer Fisher's false representation - that 
there was methamphetamine in Mr. Rozajewski's room [because Ms. Lee had seen it 
there] - was erroneous. 
ii. The District Court Improperly Considered The Evidence The 
Officer Might Have, But Did Not Actually, Provide To The 
Magistrate 
The other reason the district court erroneously considered the fact that Ms. Lee 
told officers that there was methamphetamine in a backpack in Mr. Rozajewski's room 
was that it was "including exculpatory information about the location of the 
methamphetamine" in its consideration of whether there was still sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause for the warrant. (R., p.82.) However, Officer Fisher did not 
testify as to where in the room Ms. Lee said the drugs and/or drug paraphernalia 
supposedly were. (See generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) He certainly 
analysis. See Chapple, 124 Idaho at 530. Thus, it struck more broadly and removed 
the entire statement "about Chapple's connection to Olsen." Id. 
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did not say anything about a backpack.8 (See generally Audio of Warrant Application 
Hearing.) Considering facts that the officer might have, but did not, present to the 
magistrate exceeds the scope of review permitted once a defendant has met his initial 
burden under Franks. 
The proper procedure under Franks provides: "If the defendant established 
perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence, and 'with the 
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient 
to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the 
search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the 
affidavit."' State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 11 (Ct. App. 1990) {quoting Franks, 438 
U.S. at 156) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals has explained, this means that 
"the false testimony simply must be set aside and a determination then made as to 
whether there remains sufficient content in the sworn testimony before the 
magistrate to support a finding of probable cause." State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 
822 (Ct. App. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 
(1991) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court cannot properly consider facts which 
were not included in the remainder of the officer's sworn testimony to the magistrate 
when evaluating whether probable cause remained after it has set aside the officer's 
misstatements. 
As a result, the district court in this case improperly included the "exculpatory 
information about the location of the methamphetamine" - specifically, that it was in a 
8 As will be discussed in depth in Section A(2), infra, the absence of testimony about the 
backpack during the warrant application hearing also means the district court's 
conclusion that this information was, in fact, known to the magistrate is clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. 
19 
backpack in Mr. Rozajewski's room-· in its probable cause analysis because those facts 
were not part of the remaining sworn testimony once the false testimony about Ms. 
Lee's statement was set aside. 
2. The District Court Made Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings About What 
Facts Had Been Presented To The Ma istrate 
The district court's evaluation of whether probable cause existed after Officer 
Fisher's false representations had been set aside is also wrong because it is based on 
the clearly erroneous finding that "[t]he information known to the magistrate was that the 
officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a tin containing 
marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of the [sic] Delisle 
and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's room." (R., pp.82-
83.) As that factual finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, this 
Court should set that clearly erroneous finding aside. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 
659 (2007). 
The problem with this factual finding is not that the individual facts are 
inconsistent with the record on appeal, but rather, that the evidence does not support 
the district court's overarching conclusion that the magistrate was aware of those 
particular facts. The specific facts regarding the nature of the drug paraphernalia and 
where those items were found came out only during the officers' testimony at the motion 
to suppress hearing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.4.) Those facts were not 
presented to the magistrate during the warrant application hearing. ( See generally 
Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) The recording of the warrant application hearing 
is dispositive as to what information was before the magistrate, and it directly 
contradicts the district court's factual finding in this regard. 
20 
The first clearly erroneous aspect of the district court's description of what the 
magistrate knew about the nature of the items found prior to the application for a 
warrant. For example, the district court concluded that the magistrate was aware that 
there was "a tin containing marijuana" is clearly erroneous. (R., p.83 (emphasis 
added).) All Officer Fisher said about the tin at the warrant application hearing was that 
"[d]rug paraphernalia consisted of a marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a 
methamphetamine pipe. . . ." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00 
(emphasis added).) In fact, Officer Fisher described all those items as "paraphernalia." 
(See Audio of \Narrant Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00.) Therefore, the district court's 
conclusion that the magistrate knew about the contents of the tin was also clearly 
erroneous. 
The second clearly erroneous aspect of the district court's finding addresses the 
location those items were found. The district court found that, "[t]he information known 
to the magistrate was that the officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the 
living room, a tin containing marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in 
the bedroom of the [sic] Delisle and Lechner .... "9 (R., pp.82-83 (emphasis 
added).) However, at no time during that hearing did Officer Fisher testify that this drug 
paraphernalia had been found in any of the bedrooms or the kitchen. (See generally 
Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) He only testified that, "[u]pon entering [the 
house], they [the other officers] found drug paraphernalia in plain view. Drug 
paraphernalia consisted of a marijuana pipe, tin can, a snort tube, a methamphetamine 
9 While the testimony at the motion to suppress hearing indicates that the other officers 
had gathered that evidence together to show Officer Fisher, no such representation was 
made to the magistrate judge. As such, that information cannot be included in 
assessing the validity of the warrant. 
21 
pipe ..... [I believed there were drugs in Mr. Rozajewski's room d]ue to all the drugs 
found in the residence in the common area .... " (Audio of Warrant Application 
Hearing, 1 :45-2:00, 6:36-6:54 (emphasis added).) The closest Officer Fisher got to 
specifically stating where those items had been found was his testimony that he had 
seen these items "in the front living area as soon as you walked in the front door." 
(Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 2:32-2:46 (emphasis added).) Therefore, the 
district court's findings that the magistrate was aware that the drug paraphernalia was 
found in Mr. De/isle's bedroom and in the kitchen were not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Therefore, this Court should set those clearly erroneous findings 
aside. 
In that same regard, the district court's conclusion that the magistrate knew the 
drug paraphernalia had been found in backpacks was clearly erroneous. Specifically, 
the district court found that, "[t]he information known to the magistrate was that the 
officers had found a marijuana pipe in a backpack in the living room, a tin containing 
marijuana on the kitchen counter, drug paraphernalia in the bedroom of the [sic] Delisle 
and Lechner, and methamphetamine in a backpack in defendant's room." (R., pp.82-
83 (emphasis added).) Officer Fisher never mentioned any backpacks in his testimony 
to the magistrate at the warrant application hearing. (See generally Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing.) In fact, Officer Fisher testified to the magistrate that the drug 
paraphernalia was found in the common area was in "plain view." (Audio of Warrant 
Application Hearing, 1 :45-2:00.) It is hard to reconcile how this drug paraphernalia 
could be in a backpack, and yet also be in plain view. 
Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the magistrate was aware that the 
drug paraphernalia was in backpacks is clearly erroneous in light of the audio recording 
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of the warrant application hearing. It and all the other clearly erroneous findings the 
district court made in this regard should be set aside. 
Allowing these clearly erroneous factual determinations to remain in the record is 
particularly problematic in this case because the district court has to determine whether, 
based on the information actually presented to the magistrate, probable cause was still 
established. See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. 156. However, those clearly erroneous 
descriptions of the location and nature of the drug paraphernalia found in the common 
area of the house were an integral part of the district court's analysis on that issue. 
(R., pp.82-83.) Therefore, the presence of those clearly erroneous factual findings 
actually further demonstrates why this Court should reverse the order denying the 
motion to suppress based on the district court's failure to properly apply the Franks 
standard. 
3. Considering Only The Evidence That Was Properly Presented To The 
Magistrate, There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish Probable Cause 
To Search Mr. Rozajewski's Room 
Once Officer Fisher's false representations are properly set aside, as are all the 
clearly erroneous factual findings about what facts were before the magistrate, the only 
evidence remaining in Officer Fisher's sworn testimony at the warrant application 
hearing upon which probable cause might be based was that drug paraphernalia had 
been "found in the common area of the house." (Audio of Warrant Application Hearing, 
6:36-6:54; see generally Audio of Warrant Application Hearing.) That evidence is not 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search Mr. Rozajewski's room. 
In order to establish probable cause, the State must show "a nexus between 
criminal activity and the item to be seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized 
and the place to be searched." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2003). That nexus 
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must be "established by specific facts; an officer's general conciusions are not enough." 
Id. To establish that nexus, "there must be some facts, in addition to the finding of 
probable cause that the person has committed a crime, which would support a finding 
that there is a fair probability that the items sought are in the location which the officers 
seek to search," though magistrates may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
in this regard. State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637,644 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In this case, once the false representations are set aside, there are no specific 
facts actually presented to the magistrate that created a nexus between Mr. Rozajewski 
and the items being sought (and thus, between Mr. Rozajewski and criminal 
activity), nor were there specific facts creating a nexus between those items and 
Mr. Rozajewski's room. 
Rather, the only thing presented at the warrant application hearing properly 
speaking to any sort of connection between Mr. Rozajewski or his room and the items 
being sought was Officer Fisher's general conclusion that, because there were drugs in 
the common area, there must also be drugs in Mr. Rozjewski's room. (See Audio of 
Warrant Application Hearing, 6:36-6:54.) However, such general conclusions are not 
sufficient to establish probable cause. Yager, 139 Idaho at 686. 
Thus, absent that sort of specific connection between Mr. Rozajewski and the 
drug paraphernalia found elsewhere in the house, the evidence properly presented to 
the magistrate judge failed to establish probable cause that there would be evidence of 
a crime in Mr. Rozajewski's room. Compare State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 347 
(2011 ). In Hansen, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the fact that officers 
found drugs in the bathroom of the defendant's home was sufficient to give rise to 
probable cause to search the rest of the defendant's home. Id. This was true even 
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though the defendant allowed another person, who was living in a trailer in the back 
yard, to also use that bathroom. Id. In this case, however, Mr. Rozajewski was not the 
owner of the home, and therefore, the fact that there were drugs elsewhere in the house 
did not give same specific connection that existed in Hansen - between the home 
owner and all the rooms of his home. Therefore, there was no specific connection 
between that drug paraphernalia and Mr. Rozajewski himself nor was there any specific 
connection between that drug paraphernalia and his room. 
As a result, with the false statements properly set aside and considering only the 
remaining evidence actually presented to the magistrate, there was not sufficient 
evidence to give rise to probable cause for the warrant to search Mr. Rozajewski's 
room. Since there was not probable cause, "the search warrant must be voided and the 
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the 
face of the affidavit." Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. This means that all the evidence found 
in Mr. Rozajewski's room during the search under the warrant needed to be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rozajewski respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his 
motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2015. ,,,,-7 -~ // "' /1'///y / 2----,7' ( ,/ .,;,/ ;:: ____ _ 
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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